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Abstract
Background: Crew resource management (CRM) has the potential to enhance patient safety in intensive care units
(ICU) by improving the use of non-technical skills. However, CRM evaluation studies in health care are inconclusive
with regard to the effect of this training on behaviour and organizational outcomes, due to weak study designs
and the scarce use of direct observations. Therefore, the aim of this study is to determine the effectiveness and
cost-effectiveness of CRM training on attitude, behaviour and organization after one year, using a multi-method
approach and matched control units. The purpose of the present article is to describe the study protocol and the
underlying choices of this evaluation study of CRM in the ICU in detail.
Methods/Design: Six ICUs participated in a paired controlled trial, with one pre-test and two post test
measurements (respectively three months and one year after the training). Three ICUs were trained and compared
to matched control ICUs. The 2-day classroom-based training was delivered to multidisciplinary groups. Typical
CRM topics on the individual, team and organizational level were discussed, such as situational awareness,
leadership and communication. All levels of Kirkpatrick’s evaluation framework (reaction, learning, behaviour and
organisation) were assessed using questionnaires, direct observations, interviews and routine ICU administration
data.
Discussion: It is expected that the CRM training acts as a generic intervention that stimulates specific
interventions. Besides effectiveness and cost-effectiveness, the assessment of the barriers and facilitators will
provide insight in the implementation process of CRM.
Trial registration: Netherlands Trial Register (NTR): NTR1976
Background
The risks, potential harm and costs of adverse events for
patients at intensive care units (ICU) are larger than in
other hospital departments [1], making improvement of
patient safety in ICUs all the more important. The ICU
is particularly vulnerable in terms of patient safety
threats related to ineffective teamwork or failure to fol-
low protocol [2,3]. Results of a Dutch record review
study revealed that 9.4% of all patients admitted to the
ICU experienced one or more adverse events, which is
far above the average of a hospital (5.7%)[4]. Of these
adverse events 50% were considered highly preventable.
Similarly, Vincent and colleagues [5] reported 1.7
adverse events per patient per day in a medical-surgical
ICU.
It has been demonstrated that unsafe care more often
originates from problems with non-technical skills than
from a lack of technical expertise [6,7]. Non-technical
skills are ‘the cognitive, social and personal resource
skills that complement technical skills and contribute to
safe and efficient task performance’ [8]. For example to
be explicit in coordinating tasks or to share information.
Studies have shown that a lack of non-technical skills
led to poor teamwork resulting in critical incidents in
the ICU [9,10].
Both national and international health authorities have
advocated crew resource management (CRM) as a
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method to improve non-technical skills, especially in
emergency departments, surgery and intensive care
[11-13]. CRM, which has its roots in high-risk industries
such as aviation [14], was developed in the early 1980’s
as a response to the finding that unsafe flight conditions
were frequently the result of failures in pilots’ non-tech-
nical skills rather than a lack in technical knowledge
[15]. It has been shown that CRM can effectively
improve safety in a variety of professional domains, such
as nuclear power and offshore oil production [16,17]. It
is plausible that the general principles of CRM can be
used in the ICU as well, because the ICU shares charac-
teristics with workplaces where CRM has been proven
to be effective, such as high-stake outcomes, complex
actions, and high time pressure [18].
CRM is based on the premise that human error is
avoidable, but can never be eradicated. It is typically
directed at creating awareness of human factors and
performance limiters [19], and at teaching behaviours to
neutralize these threats, for instance through leadership
and speaking up [15]. Furthermore, it forces participants
to assess and think about personal and peer behaviour.
Concepts that are introduced during the training include
inquiry, seeking relevant task related information, advo-
cacy, communicating proposed actions, conflict resolu-
tion and decision making [19-21]. Thus, CRM is
directed at increasing awareness of human limitations
and changing team behaviour and communication in
order to improve the management unsafe situations and,
as a result, reduce adverse events.
Although several studies have been carried out to
evaluate the effectiveness of CRM in health care [22,23],
none were conducted at an ICU. Rabøl and colleagues
[24] conducted a systematic review about the reported
effects of CRM training in health care. They found that
the first reaction to the training was very positive and
that attitudes changed in favour of the CRM principles.
For instance, France and colleagues [25] reported that
trainees indicated that CRM has the potential to
increase patient safety and quality of care. However,
going one step further, looking at behavioural change
and the impact of the training on the organisational
level (e.g. reduced number of bed days per patient), the
results are less straight forward. For example, McCul-
loch and colleagues [26] found an increase of the use of
non-technical skills for nurses, but not for anaesthetists
and surgeons.
There are several reasons for these inconsistent find-
ings, which stipulate the necessity for the present
research. It can be argued that a lack of consistent find-
ings on a behavioural and organizational level is due to
weak study designs. Most of the studies evaluate the
effect of CRM within six months [24], which is a rela-
tively short period for an innovation to be completely
adopted and to become part of the daily routine [27]. In
addition, most evaluations rely on a pre- and post train-
ing comparison, but do not include a control group
[24]. In some studies the trained and non-trained parti-
cipants were not separated in data gathering. Further-
more, observations have hardly ever been used to
measure behavioural change, despite the high validity of
this method as it measures behaviours when they actu-
ally occur.
Therefore the aim of the study is to determine the
effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of CRM on attitude,
behaviour and organization one year after the training.
In order to reach this goal, we will use a multi-method
approach using questionnaires, direct observations, and
interviews. Trained ICUs will be compared with
matched control units using pre- and post measure-
ments. The purpose of the present article is to describe
the study protocol and the underlying choices of this
evaluation study of CRM in the ICU in detail.
Methods/Design
Design and setting
Ideally, a CRM training should be evaluated in a large
multicenter trial [28]. In our case, time and money were
limited, thus we looked for an alternative way to control
for institutional variation. We chose for a paired con-
trolled trial, with one pre-test and two post test mea-
surements. Three pairs of comparable ICUs were
selected out of a predefined cluster of eligible medium
sized units (10 to 16 beds and 55 to 88 employees) of
non-academic teaching hospitals. This type of ICU was
chosen because these are large enough to form an inde-
pendent unit, yet small enough to train all of the staff.
Moreover, most ICUs in the Netherlands belong to this
category or aim to accomplish this. Per pair one ICU
received the training directly after the pre-test measure-
ment and one ICU served as a control group. The parti-
cipating hospitals had on average 641 beds and are
located in an urban environment.
Data collection took place from November 2009 until
May 2010 (pre-test), June 2010 until September 2010
(post-test 1), and in November 2010 until May 2011
(post-test 2). In each measurement period data were
simultaneously collected for the intervention and control
unit, and consecutively for all pairs. Per pair each mea-
surement period took 7 to 9 weeks. The intervention
units received the training directly after the pre-test.
The first post measurement was conducted three
months after the training and the second post-measure-
ment followed one year after the training.
ICUs that fitted the profile of a possible intervention
unit (i.e. hospital type; ICU size, level and staffing;
closed format; taking part in the Dutch National Inten-
sive Care Evaluation (NICE) registry [29]) were
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approached to participate in the present study (n = 12).
Most of these ICUs were interested in CRM but unable
to fulfil financial needs to start within the study period.
Four ICUs were willing to act as an intervention unit
and able to pass formal barriers, like finance and organi-
sational arrangements. Of these four, one unit served as
a pilot unit, and the other three units served as the
intervention group in the main study.
The remaining eight ICUs that fitted the profile were
assessed to determine whether they could be matched
to one of the intervention ICUs and act as control unit.
This assessment comprised a structured conversation
with the medical head and team leader and a measure-
ment of the patient safety culture of all the IC-staff by
means of the patient safety culture questionnaire [30],
which was assessed in the intervention units as well.
Important determinants in the matching procedure were
the number of beds of the ICU, the number of ICU phy-
sicians (fte’s), urban or rural area, the perception of
patient safety, and the frequency of event reporting. The
ICUs that were most similar to one of the intervention
ICUs were matched to that ICU and served as a control
unit. A total of three pairs of ICUs participated in our
study.
The study was approved by the Ethical Committee of
the VU University Medical Centre and is in accordance
with Dutch privacy regulations. The trial is registered in
the Dutch Trial Registration record NTR1976.
Pilot study
A pilot study was conducted in one ICU with the aim to
test whether the planned measurements were organisa-
tionally and logistically feasible. Furthermore, the pilot
offered a chance for the researchers to get more
acquainted with the CRM training as well as with the
general daily routine at an ICU. The results of the pilot
study indicated that the training was well received and
that the planning of the measurements was realistic.
Some measurements needed a bit more refinement. For
instance, some important verbal behaviours were added
to the observation form (e.g. the participant asks for
input). Furthermore, the pilot indicated that a CRM
change team was important to follow up the plans of
action resulting from the training. It was suggested to
include three or four IC employees with different back-
grounds (e.g. a nurse, an ICU physician, a manager) in
the change team. Therefore, in the main study we sti-
mulated to form this change team during the training.
Intervention: Crew Resource Management training
A commercial vendor of CRM, QST Safe Skies, was
contracted to deliver the training. This vendor has
much experience with CRM trainings in the aviation
sector, as well as in health care. Before the training, all
ICU personnel was informed about the study and the
training by means of an oral presentation and an infor-
mation leaflet. Contact between the vendor and the
researcher was kept to a minimum during the period in
which the ICUs were trained.
The training was classroom based and consisted of a
class education session of two consecutive days from 9
till 17 o’clock. Due to a maximum of 15 participants per
session, several trainings were organized to educate all
members of the IC staff. To limit the period between
the training of the first and the last group, every week
at least one group was trained. It was made sure that in
each group all professions were represented.
The main objectives of the training sessions were to
create awareness regarding the threats of suboptimal
performance and ways to recognize these threats and
prevent their negative consequences. To establish this
goal, the participants were educated about CRM con-
cepts and principles, discussed their own experiences
with each other, and developed ready to use ideas, all in
a setting of trust and openness.
With situational awareness as a starting point to iden-
tify pitfalls and opportunities for enhancement of the
quality of care, several topics were discussed on an orga-
nizational, team, and individual level (see Figure 1 and
Table 1). Each topic was first introduced by describing
the global working mechanisms. This was followed by
the risks associated with the specific topic and a sug-
gested approach to overcome these risks. Exercises were
used to illustrate or highlight some of the key points.
For instance, communication was first theoretically dis-
cussed using the sender-receiver model [31]. This was
followed by a discussion about what can go wrong in
this communication process. To further illustrate com-
munication flaws participants heard a story which they
then had to repeat to another person. This showed how
quick people forget or even alter parts of a message.
Near the end of this part of the training solutions were
given to overcome the risks and pitfalls regarding com-
munication (e.g. verify with your sender whether you
understood the message correctly).
There were two ways in which CRM concepts were
translated into ready to use ideas. At the beginning of
the training a discussion about the team roles of differ-
ent professions in an ICU was carried out. These roles
were interactively defined and written down on a sheet.
These sheets were readily accessible for modification or
adding content when something new was learned. At
the end of both the first and second day, plans of action
on organizational, team and individual level were formu-
lated by the participants.
A CRM change team was formed in each trained
ICU to stimulate and facilitate the implementation of
CRM initiatives after the training had ended. This
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team consisted of enthused representatives of all the
professions and management which. The plans of
actions of all the training sessions formed the starting
point. Who and how many people exactly joined the
change team was different for each ICU. Part of the
training is that the two CRM instructors offer their
help as consultant for one day or two day parts after
the ICU was trained. It was up to the change team
Team 
- Situational leadership 
- Communication and 
cooperation 
- Groupthink 
Situational awareness 
Individual
- Stress management 
- Personality 
- Feedback and self-reflection
Organisation 
- Human Factors and TRM 
- Threats and errors
Behaviour / action 
Decision making 
Figure 1 Schematic representation of the structure of the CRM training.
Table 1 A specification of the most important models and theories that were discussed during the CRM training
SHELL-model [62,63] The SHELL-model emphasizes that human error develops during the interaction between a person (central
Lifeware) and the other components of the model, which are Software, Hardware, Environment and other
Lifeware.
Swiss Cheese Model [37] The Swiss Cheese Model of Reason distinguishes different layers, or ‘slices’, that act as defences or barriers to
local hazards. Each layer has flaws, or ‘holes’, due to active failures and latent conditions. An accident
opportunity occurs when different holes line up.
Human Factor Analysis
Classification Model [64]
The Human Factor Analysis Classification Model is a framework based on the Swiss Cheese model of Reason
and identifies and classifies human causes of error. It defines the ‘holes in the cheese’.
Sender-Receiver model [31] The sender sends a (non-)verbal message to the receiver. How this message will be received depends on the
content (the objective aspect), the oblivious added information (the expressive aspect), the relation between
the sender and receiver (the relational aspect) and the influence that the sender wants to have on the receiver
(the appealing aspect).
Situational Leadership [65] This model is used to illustrate different styles of leadership and their effectiveness (e.g. ‘push’ and ‘pull’
strategy or ‘relation’ versus ‘tasks’ oriented leadership). Different situations demand different styles to get the
desired outcome
Situation awareness [66] Situational awareness is 1) the perception and the comprehension of the meaning of environmental elements
within a volume of time and space, and 2) the projection of their status and 3) the possible consequences in
the near future.
The Johari window [67] The Johari window is an assessment of the self by yourself and others. There are things that you know and
don’t know about yourself and there are things that others know and don’t know about you. To optimise
performance it is necessary to enhance the knowledge of yourself and diminish the part that you and others
don’t know.
Groupthink [68] Groupthink is a state of mind of a cohesive group with deeply involved members in which an unanimous
decision is more important than to appraise alternatives. There are eight classic symptoms of groupthink: 1)
Illusions of invulnerability; 2) Rationalizing warnings; 3) Unquestioned belief in morality of the group; 4)
Stereotyping those who are opposed to the group; 5) Direct pressure to conform; 6) Self censorship; 7) Illusions
of unanimity amongst group members; 8) Mind guards shielding for dissenting information.
Stress (management) According to the classic Yerkes Dodson law the relation between stress and performance can be described as
an inverted U-shaped pattern. It is vital for performance to maintain the most optimal stress level, therefore to
much or to little stress has to be prevented (e.g. through anticipation, mental and physical preparation, mutual
trust) or be managed by focusing on the problem or changing emotion, thoughts or behaviour that enhances
stress.
Dangerous attitudes To illustrate how personality can influence decision making five prototypes of dangerous attitudes are
discussed. These prototypes are: the anti-authority (will not comply to any rule); the impulsive (acts directly
without thinking it through); the invulnerable (thinks that accidents happen only to other people); the macho
(wants to prove him/herself in any circumstance); the drop-out (thinks that he/she does not matter).
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how to utilize this help (e.g. get organised; implement
changes; reiterate theory).
Framework of analysis and data collection
The present study uses the evaluation framework for
training programmes of Kirkpatrick [32] to determine
the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of CRM training.
This framework comprises four levels of evaluation and
is often applied in the CRM literature [17,24]. The first
level is the reaction of the participant to CRM training.
This is followed by the level of learning, which includes
the gaining of new knowledge or skills and the constitu-
tion of new attitudes. The third level entails whether
CRM changes behaviour. The fourth level is the organi-
zational impact, for instance a decrease in the number
of adverse events as a result of CRM. Each level is
assessed with different measurements at the different
data collection periods (see Table 2). In addition to the
levels of Kirkpatrick, barriers and facilitators for success-
ful implementation of CRM are assessed, to gain insight
in the change process.
All measurements were administered simultaneously
in each pair of intervention and control unit, except for
the questionnaires regarding reaction to, and evaluation
of the training. All measurements are described below
in detail.
Measurements - Questionnaires
End-of-course critique
The End-of-Course Critique (ECC) of Grogan and collea-
gues [22] was used to assess the reaction immediately after
the training and assessed the perceived relevance and uti-
lity of the specific topics covered in the CRM training (e.g.
‘The lecture about ‘Human Factors’ was relevant and use-
ful’). The ECC consists of 21 statements that have to be
rated on a 5-point scale varying from ‘strongly disagree’ to
‘strongly agree’ and one open end question.
Evaluation questionnaire
This questionnaire was used to assess the extent to
which the training altered the awareness regarding CRM
topics in their daily work, like the influence of personal
and environmental factors on performance. Further-
more, it assesses to what extent the participant felt that
there was more situational awareness and enhanced
patient safety in the ICU as a result of the training. This
was measured with thirteen statements that had to be
rated on a 5-point scale, varying from ‘not at all’ to
‘fully applicable’.
Table 2 Overview of the measurements for each level of Kirkpatrick
Measurement properties Data collection period
Measurements per Level of Kirkpatrick #
Dimensions
#
Items
(k)
Scale Fill out time
(min)
Baseline After the
training
1st
Follow-
Up
2nd
Follow-
up
I Reaction to the training programme
- End-of-course critique questionnaire* n/a 21 5-
Likert
5 X
- Evaluation questionnaire* n/a 13 5-
Likert
5 X
II Learning from the training programme
- SafeTeamA questionnaire (attitude towards
non-technical skills)
7 43 5-
Likert
10 X X
III Behavioural change as result of the training
- SafeTeamB questionnaire (perception of the
use of non-technical skills)
7 39 5-
Likert
10 X X
- Process control questionnaire 5 28 Yes/
No
5 X X
- Observation of non-technical skills 6 30 Count n/a X X
- Interview implementation progress* n/a n/a n/a n/a X X X
IV The impact of the training on the
organisation
- - COMPaZ (Patent safety culture questionnaire) 11
- Error culture questionnaire 11 47 5-
Likert
10 X X
- Job satisfaction and affective commitment to
the ICU
7 18 5-
Likert
5 X X
- Intake questionnaire n/a n/a n/a n/a X X
- Routine administration data n/a n/a n/a n/a Continuous
* These measurements were only collected in the intervention groups
n/a = not applicable
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In addition to these items, the participant was pre-
sented with possible reasons why they did or did not
use CRM after the training. A set of 24 reasons were
derived from implementation literature [27] and the
pilot study. The participant could tick the reason(s)
which applied to them (e.g. ‘I have no time for CRM’ or
‘I am convinced that CRM is relevant’).
SafeTeam questionnaire
The SafeTeam questionnaire is a newly developed ques-
tionnaire which is partly based on the Operating Room
Management Attitudes Questionnaire (ORMAQ) [33],
specifically its items on teamwork and information shar-
ing. Other items were newly developed, derived from
insights on speaking up [34] and error management
[35]. The SafeTeam contains two sections with seven
dimensions each (see Table 3). The A-section assesses
attitudes regarding behaviours emphasized in the CRM
training. The B-section measures self-reported behaviour
regarding CRM principles. This distinction between atti-
tudes and actual behaviour is unique in the setting of
CRM evaluations. Both questionnaires use a 5-point
Likert scale as answering scale, varying from ‘not at all’
to ‘fully applicable’. The psychometric properties of the
SafeTeam will be assessed during this study.
Process control questionnaire
The process control questionnaire is an abridged version
of the Tripod survey [36] and queries about daily work
circumstances that may result in substandard acts, or
active failures [37]. These circumstances are called basic
risk factors. Groeneweg distinguishes 11 of these basic
risk factors, six of which are specific for the branch in
which the Tripod is developed (i.e. the oil industry) and
five are generic. These five generic risk factors regard
training, communication, organisation, procedures, and
incompatible goals. If these factors are not managed
properly, they can start a process that can result in a
substandard situation. For instance, when existing guide-
lines or instructions are not available or of insufficient
quality, the chance on non-adherence to these guidelines
increases, making procedures a risk factor.
In the present study relevant items in the context of
CRM evaluation were selected for each of the generic
basic risk factors, thereby reducing the number of items
from 75 to 28. For each of the statements participants
were asked whether they represented their experiences
of the last six months (e.g. ‘I could not find the informa-
tion that I needed to accomplish my task’). The partici-
pant could answer ‘yes’, ‘no’ or ‘do not know’.
Patient safety culture
The COMPaZ questionnaire [30] was used to measure
the patient safety culture in the ICU. The COMPaZ is
the translated Dutch version of the Hospital Survey on
Patient Safety Culture (HSOPS) [38]. During translation
and validation the COMPaZ was slightly altered from
the HSOPS which resulted in 11 dimensions instead of
12 by combining two dimensions of the HSOPS and
removing two items. Both questionnaires have success-
fully been used in previous research [30,38-40].
The COMPaZ consists of 40 items that assess the 11
dimensions. Each item posits a statement that has to be
rated on a 5-point scale varying from ‘strongly disagree’
to ‘strongly agree’ or ‘never’ to ‘always’. In addition, the
COMPaZ comprises a subjective rating of the quality of
patient safety in the ICU and incident reporting over
the last year.
Error culture
The Error Culture Questionnaire (ECQ), developed and
validated by Van Dyck [35,41] was used to assess shared
attitudes towards, and common responses to error on
unit level. According to Van Dyck error culture can be
split up into four dimensions, i.e. mastery (trying to
overcome errors by learning, analysing and correction),
Table 3 Dimensions and sample items of the two sections of the SafeTeam questionnaire
Dimension Sample items
SafeTeamA SafeTeamB
In my opinion... In this ICU...
Information sharing team members should ask questions if something is unclear I ask questions when something is unclear to me
Feedback seeking
& giving
every team member should be able to give feedback everyone is minding its own business*
Teamwork it is a bad idea when members of a team interfere with each others task* we work as a true team
Situational
awareness
we should as a team constantly check if something unusual occurs during
the treatment of a patient
we discuss as a team the possibility that
something unusual occurs
Speaking up someone should speak up when he or she notices that a team member is
not alert
I speak up when I notice that one of the team
members is not alert
Perceived
infallibility
it is easy to make mistakes when the tension is high* my performance is less when I am stressed or
tired
Leader coaching a successful treatment depends on the competence of the physician there is a significant difference in status between
team members
*Reversed coded
Kemper et al. BMC Health Services Research 2011, 11:304
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/11/304
Page 6 of 11
aversion (a rigid and negative attitude towards error
occurrence and their deliberate covering up), social
(sharing and helping) and awareness (a general readiness
to handle errors). Each dimension consists of two or
three scales, with a total of 11 scales for all dimensions.
These scales are measured with 47 items. Each item is a
statement regarding one of the 11 scales. Participants
have to rate to which extend this statement applies to
the unit on a 5-point scale, varying from ‘not at all’ to
‘completely’. The ECQ has been successfully used in
previous research [35,41,42].
Job satisfaction and affective commitment to the ICU
Job satisfaction was measured with the Dutch translation
[43] of the job satisfaction dimension of the Occupational
Stress Inventory (OCI) [44]. The OCI job satisfaction
contains six scales that can be used separately. Three
scales were selected for the present study (i.e. satisfaction
with (1) the job, (2) the organizational design and struc-
ture, and (3) the organizational processes). The other
three scales were considered to be of less relevance to a
CRM evaluation (i.e. appreciation, personal relations, and
rewards). The three scales that were used comprised a
total of 12 items, which are to be rated on a 5-point
scale, varying from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’.
One additional item was added to ask the participant
point-blank how satisfied they are with their job (i.e.
“Overall, how satisfied are you with your job?”).
Affective commitment was assessed with the Dutch
translation [45] of the affective subscale of the three
component conceptualization of organizational commit-
ment [46]. The questions were slightly altered to the
ICU setting by renaming the term ‘organization’ to ‘ICU’
in all of the items. The affective commitment scale com-
prises 6 statements, which are to be answered on a 5-
point Likert scale, varying from ‘not at all’ to ‘fully
applicable’.
Demographics
Several demographic characteristics were administered,
including age, gender, position, tenure, experience with
working in the hospital and in the ICU, working hours
per week, and whether or not the participant has inter-
action with patients.
Observation of non-technical skills
Direct observations were used to determine the use of
non-technical skills by the IC staff who had direct con-
tact with patients. To assess non-technical skills, an
observational model of the Royal Dutch Airlines was
used (i.e. SHAPE) [47], which was adjusted for health
care (Explicit Professional Oral Communication mea-
surement (EPOC); development and psychometric
results will be published separately).
The EPOC classifies explicit professional oral commu-
nication of an observed person into six dimensions;
assertiveness, working with others, task-oriented leader-
ship, people-oriented leadership, situational awareness,
and planning and anticipation. Each dimension is subdi-
vided into several concrete verbal behaviours that
together represent the dimension. Throughout an obser-
vation of 30 minutes an independent observer tallies
how often each verbalization is displayed by the
observed person, e.g. ‘asks for input’, ‘coordinates tasks’,
or ‘expresses concerns’. Only professional interaction
with co-workers of the ICU was tallied, so social talk or
conversations with the patients or family were not
tallied.
All observers had a non-medical background in social
sciences and were trained for four days. During this
training the observers learned the definitions of the ver-
bal behaviours and practised observing at an ICU. To
ensure that all observers rated behaviour in the same
way and were consistent over time during the data col-
lection period, regular meetings were organized to dis-
cuss complex cases. Additionally, 8% of observations
were double coded by two independent observers con-
temporaneously. Furthermore, a 17 minute video of an
ICU nurse was used to check the observers’ consistency
over time. Blinding observers for intervention status of a
unit was not possible. Therefore, medical staff was
instructed not to discuss the training or CRM issues
with the observers and the observers were kept ignorant
of the content of the training.
The ICU staff was observed during daily practice, pre-
ferably two or three times on different days. All observa-
tions took place between 7 am and 7 pm. Each
observation had a duration of 30 minutes. At the end of
each observation the observed person was asked to fill
out the NASA Task Load Index (NASA-TLX) [48] to
measure the perceived workload during the observation.
The observer independently scored workload as well.
Next, the observer filled out which tasks the observed
person had done during the thirty minutes of observa-
tion, whether there were enough possibilities for profes-
sional communication to display non-technical skills,
what the level of care the patient received, the number
of professional interactions, and with whom.
Other Measurements
Interview implementation progress
Semi-structured interviews were conducted directly after
the training and again one year later, to assess if and
how CRM had been implemented and what, if any, the
stimulating and hindering factors were in this process.
Directly after the training the first interview was con-
ducted with one or two persons who introduced CRM
to the ICU. The aim of this interview was to discover
how CRM came and stayed on the agenda, whether a
change team was formed, whether there had been
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contact with the CRM trainers prior to the training, and
whether and how CRM was embedded with existing
processes or structures at the unit.
One year after the training, during the second follow-
up data collection period, an interview was held with
the chairman of the change team. The aim of this inter-
view was to examine whether, and if so, in what ways
the ICU had actually implemented CRM after the train-
ing. Furthermore, it was asked what their present CRM
initiatives were, and what the future directions were. As
in the first interview there was special attention to fac-
tors that enhanced or hindered successful implementa-
tion of CRM. In addition, this second interview aimed
to examine the tangible effects of CRM as well as to
document the ‘do’s’ and ‘don’ts’ for future CRM trained
departments.
Adverse events
Adverse events were assessed using the ‘top 9’ of
adverse outcomes as defined by the adverse outcome
committee of the Dutch Association of Intensive Care
[49], which are (1) Myocardial infarction; (2) Cardiac
arrest, (3) Pneumothorax; (4) Cerebrovascular accident;
(5) Critical illness neuro-myopathy; (6) Airway related
problems except tracheotomy related problems; (7) Tra-
cheotomy related complications; (8) Problems with vas-
cular access; (9) Bleeding in the proximal and distant
digestive tracts. These adverse outcomes were measured
using an electronic registration form which was inte-
grated with the digital medical record. Registration was
done by the IC physicians as part of the medical record.
Patient outcomes
Patient characteristics were registered following current
registration standards from the Dutch National Intensive
Care Evaluation study [29]. These data were obtained
from routine administrative systems following strict defi-
nitions and quality checks [50]. Baseline characteristics
were collected, using these systems, as defined in the
minimal dataset of NICE, which includes general char-
acteristics, such as age, sex, acute and chronic diagnoses,
number of admissions, mortality and standardized mor-
tality ratio, Variable Life-Adjusted Display curve, start
time and end time of mechanical ventilation, and dis-
charge data from the ICU and hospital. Furthermore,
several scoring systems were used to assess the severity
of disease(s) and life expectancy of the patient, such as
APACHE II [51], APACHE IV [52] and SAPS II [53].
These scores were used to adjust for differences in
patient mix. All patient data for this study are
anonymous.
Additional ICU data - Intake questionnaire
The intake questionnaire assessed basic information
about the ICU and was filled out by the head of the
ICU. It assessed the number of ICUs within the hospital
and the corresponding number of beds per ICU, the
total of full time employees, the number of permanent
(more than six months) and temporary (less than six
months) staff, the percentage of sick leave, participation
in NICE registration, the teaching possibilities, the
method and use of incident reporting, and the level of
the ICU. ICU level refers to the complexity of care that
the ICU can manage, varying from a close watch of cri-
tical patients for a short number of days (level one) to
complex treatment that requires advanced technology
and 24 hours per day availability of IC physician (level
three). Finally, the intake comprised a question whether
the ICU has a closed (specialized IC physician as main
clinician) or an open format (the referring physician as
main clinician).
Statistical analyses
The collected data will be checked for completeness and
the characteristics and frequency of missing data will be
described. Descriptive statistics will be used to describe
baseline characteristics of patients, staff and ICU. Com-
parability of paired intervention and control ICUs will
be assessed by comparing baseline data and structural
indicators (e.g. number of beds). The effect of the CRM
training will be assessed by comparing the before and
after measurements of the intervention and control
ICUs on all levels of Kirkpatrick’s evaluation framework.
Changes in patient safety culture, attitude and teamwork
behaviour will be described and tested with the ANOVA
procedure for repeated measures. This will be done on
an individual level with adjustment for the unit. With
the observations it is plausible that the different obser-
vations within one person will cluster with each other.
To control for this clustering, a multilevel analysis will
be applied with additional adjustment for the unit.
Changes in patient outcomes or incidence of adverse
outcomes during the follow-up will be assessed using
linear regression analysis while adjusting for case-mix
differences and clustering within an ICU.
Cost-effectiveness analysis
An economic evaluation will be carried out from a soci-
etal perspective and according to the Dutch guidelines
for costing in economic evaluations [54,55]. The costs of
CRM training will be assessed bottom-up, based on per-
sonnel time, material, housing and travel costs spend on
the training. Direct medical costs of hospital stay will be
assessed by multiplying the number of bed days in- and
outside ICU with standard cost-prices from a societal
perspective. If relevant, costs of extra interventions
related to adverse outcomes during ICU stay will be
included.
To assess the cost-effectiveness of CRM training com-
pared to no training with regard to patient safety at
ICUs, the incremental costs per prevented adverse
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outcome will be computed. In addition a cost-benefit
analysis will be performed to compare incremental costs
of training with incremental costs of hospital stay.
Interpretation of the results
To describe the expected effects of the CRM training
the causal chain of Brown [56] can be used (see Figure
2). This model is based on Donabedian’s [57] distinction
between structure, process and outcome. Structure, the
exogenous factors that cannot be completely determined
by managers within the organization, influences the
endogenous processes within the organization. These
processes in turn affect the outcomes and throughput of
the organization. According to Brown [56] interventions
can influence the process component of this model. He
distinguishes two types of interventions: A generic and a
specific intervention. A generic intervention is directed
at the management or organizational processes of an
organisation. A specific intervention focuses on clinical
processes. This distinction can be compared to the
latent and active failures of Reason [37]. Intervening
variables, like morale and culture, connect the manage-
ment and clinical processes.
Prerequisite for a successful intervention is that the
fidelity is high. The fidelity of an intervention is the
extent to which it is executed as it was supposed to be
executed [58] or as Brown [59] states: “Did it do what
was said on the can?” (p.172). We expect that the train-
ing has a high fidelity. First of all because the interven-
tion ICUs are highly motivated to receive the training as
they invested money and staff time. Furthermore, the
training is well developed through previous experience
of the instructors. This is also illustrated by the first
reaction of the participants of the pilot study, of which
over 87% (n = 71) stated that the presentations and
exercises were relevant and useful.
When CRM is positioned in the causal chain, it can be
labelled as a generic intervention that generates specific
interventions. By raising awareness of, and creating a
shared perspective on, the threats and opportunities in
their daily work processes, it enables personnel to recog-
nise strengths and weaknesses [60]. It is expected that
this will result in specific interventions to improve these
weaknesses and maintain the strengths. For instance, the
trained ICU staff can apply the CRM lessons about
communication to develop a checklist for clinical hand-
overs in order to minimize miscommunication in this
particular situation.
It is expected that the training will result in changes in
the intermediate variables of the causal chain, which will
result in specific improvement actions in practice. First,
small interventions may be implemented to gain rapid
success, i.e. installing and using a white board for com-
munication. It may take more time to implement more
complex and structural changes, such as implementing a
protocol for safe patient transport. The ultimate goal of
the training is that CRM principles are structurally
embedded in the organization of the ICU and adopted
as an integral part of the patient safety and error man-
agement culture.
Concluding remarks
The present study design is developed to assess the
effects of CRM in the ICU, as well as to describe the
process that explain such effects. What makes this study
unique relative to other CRM evaluations is the combi-
nation of the long follow up of one year, the assessment
of behavioural change with observations, and the use of
matched control units. As recommended and used by
several authors [17,23] the framework of Kirkpatrick is
employed to distinguish different levels of effect. Besides
the observations, a mix of different instruments is used
Throughput, 
eg, number of 
patients 
treatedSpecific
intervention 
Fidelity 
Intervening 
variables,
eg morale 
Structure Patient 
outcomes 
Fidelity 
Generic 
intervention 
Management 
processes 
Latent errors 
Clinical 
processes 
Active errors 
Figure 2 Causal chain linking interventions to outcomes [56].
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in order to explain the effect on the levels of Kirkpa-
trick’s framework. The matched control units protect
the study against secular trends and sudden changes
[61].
This study design pays particular attention to practical-
ities of implementing CRM, by incorporating the assess-
ment of barriers and facilitators to follow up on CRM
initiatives developed during the training. This will increase
the understanding of the effect of CRM training at the
behavioural and organizational level [24]. Furthermore,
knowledge on barriers and facilitators will provide a prag-
matic start for units that consider training their unit.
Improving the use of non-technical skills of health
care professionals in the ICU provides an opportunity to
enhance the quality of care and decrease the number of
adverse events. CRM appears to take full advantage of
this opportunity. It stimulates the individual, as well as
the team, to be aware of threats and risks and to man-
age unsafe situations effectively, for instance by commu-
nicating more explicitly. The plans of action resulting
from the CRM training provide concrete starting points
to implement CRM initiatives, which in turn can create
a snowball effect of generic and specific interventions
aimed at the improvement of quality and safety of the
ICU. These initiatives may improve the management
and clinical processes of the unit as well as patient out-
comes. By learning from previous research, incorporat-
ing new perspectives and keeping an eye on the
practical implications, this study design will determine
how and to what extent CRM training accomplishes
these effects.
Abbreviations
APACHE: Acute Physiology and Chronic Health Evaluation; CRM: Crew
Resource Management; ICU: Intensive Care Unit; NICE: Dutch National
Intensive Care Evaluation; SAPS: Simplified Acute Physiology Score
Acknowledgements
This study is funded by Zon-MW, the Dutch Organisation for Health
Research and Development. We would like to thank Patricia Antersijn, Fred
Bleeker, Inge van Noord, Ellen Smit, Ralph So and Peter Tangkau for their
contributions and advice in the development of this study design.
Author details
1Department of Public and Occupational Health; EMGO+ Institute for Health
and Care Research, VU Medical Center, Van der Boechorststraat 7, 1081 BT
Amsterdam, The Netherlands. 2Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of
Organization Sciences, VU University, De Boelelaan 1081, 1081 HV
Amsterdam, The Netherlands. 3The Netherlands Institute of Health Services
Research (NIVEL), Otterstraat 118, 3513 CR Utrecht, The Netherlands.
Authors’ contributions
PK drafted the final manuscript. MdB conceived the design of the study,
drafted the initial research proposal and helped to draft the final manuscript.
CvD and CW participated in the design of the study and helped to draft the
manuscript. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Received: 18 July 2011 Accepted: 10 November 2011
Published: 10 November 2011
References
1. Pronovost P: A passion for quality. Accelerating Change Today (A.C.T.) for
America’s health: care in the ICU-teaming up to improve quality National
Coalition on Health Care, Institute for Healthcare Improvement. Washington;
2002, 2-3.
2. Pronovost PJ, Thompson DA, Holzmueller CG, Lubomski LH, Morlock LL:
Defining and measuring patient safety. Critical Care Clinics 2005, 21:1-19,
vii.
3. Rodriguez-Paz JM, Kennedy M, Salas E, Wu AW, Sexton JB, Hunt EA,
Pronovost PJ: Beyond “see one, do one, teach one": toward a different
training paradigm. Quality and Safety in Health Care 18:63-68.
4. Zegers M, de Bruijne MC, Wagner C, Hoonhout LHF, Waaijman R, Smits M,
Hout FAG, Zwaan L, Christiaans-Dingelhoff I, Timmermans DRM, et al:
Adverse events and potentially preventable deaths in Dutch hospitals:
results of a retrospective patient record review study. Quality and Safety
in Health Care 2009, 18:297-302.
5. Vincent C, Taylor-Adams S, Stanhope N: Framework for analysing risk and
safety in clinical medicine. BMJ 1998, 316:1154-1157.
6. Yule S, Flin R, Paterson-Brown S, Maran N: Non-technical skills for
surgeons in the operating room: a review of the literature. Surgery 2006,
139:140-149.
7. Wolff AM, Bourke J: Reducing medical errors: a practical guide. Medical
Journal of Australia 2000, 173:247-251.
8. Flin R, Patey R, Glavin R, Maran N: Anaesthetists’ non-technical skills. British
Journal of Anaesthesia 2010, 105:38-44.
9. Reader TW, Flin R, Mearns K, Cuthbertson BH: Developing a team
performance framework for the intensive care unit. Critical Care Medicine
2009, 37:1787-1793.
10. Wright MC, Phillips-Bute BG, Petrusa ER, Griffin KL, Hobbs GW, Taekman JM:
Assessing teamwork in medical education and practice: relating
behavioural teamwork ratings and clinical performance. Medical Teacher
2009, 31:30-38.
11. Kohn LT, Corrigan JM, Donaldson MS: To Err is Human: Building a Safer
Health Care System Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press; 2000.
12. Raad voor Gezondheidsonderzoek [Advisory Council on Health Research]:
Onderzoek Patiëntveiligheid [Patient Safety Research] Den Haag; 2005.
13. Pizzi L, Goldfrab NI, Nash DB: Crew Resource Management and its
applications in medicine. In Making Health Care Safer: A Critical Analysis of
Patient Safety Practices. Edited by: Shojania KG, Duncan BW, MacDonald KM,
Wachter RM, Markowitz AJ. Rockville, MD: Agency for Healthcare Research
and Quality; 2001:.
14. Helmreich RL, Merritt AC, Wilhelm JA: The evolution of Crew Resource
Management training in commercial aviation. International Journal of
Aviation Psychology 1999, 9:19-32.
15. Helmreich RL: On error management: lessons from aviation. BMJ 2000,
320:781-785.
16. Salas E, Fowlkes JE, Stout RJ, Milanovich DM, Prince C: Does CRM training
improve teamwork skills in the cockpit?: Two evaluation studies. Human
Factors 1999, 41:326-343.
17. Salas E, Wilson KA, Burke CS, Wightman DC: Does crew resource
management training work? An update, an extension, and some critical
needs. Human Factors 2006, 48:392-412.
18. Morey JC, Simon R, Jay GD, Wears RL, Salisbury M, Dukes KA, Berns SD:
Error reduction and performance improvement in the emergency
department through formal teamwork training: evaluation results of the
MedTeams project. Health Services Research 2002, 37:1553-1581.
19. Oriol MD: Crew resource management: applications in healthcare
organizations. Journal of Nursing Administration 2006, 36:402-406.
20. Thomas EJ, Sherwood GD, Helmreich RL: Lessons from aviation: teamwork
to improve patient safety. Nursing Economics 2003, 21:241-243.
21. Kosnik LK: The new paradigm of crew resource management: just what
is needed to re-engage the stalled collaborative movement? Joint
Commission Journal on Quality Improvement 2002, 28:235-241.
22. Grogan EL, Stiles RA, France DJ, Speroff T, Morris JA Jr, Nixon B, Gaffney FA,
Seddon R, Pinson CW: The impact of aviation-based teamwork training
on the attitudes of health-care professionals. Journal of the American
College of Surgeons 2004, 199:843-848.
Kemper et al. BMC Health Services Research 2011, 11:304
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/11/304
Page 10 of 11
23. Haller G, Garnerin P, Morales MA, Pfister R, Berner M, Irion O, Clergue F,
Kern C: Effect of crew resource management training in a
multidisciplinary obstetrical setting. International Journal for Quality in
Health Care 2008, 20:254-263.
24. Rabol LI, Ostergaard D, Mogensen T: Outcomes of classroom-based team
training interventions for multiprofessional hospital staff. A systematic
review. Quality and Safety in Health Care 2010, 19:1-11.
25. France DJ, Stiles R, Gaffney EA, Seddon MR, Grogan EL, Nixon WR Jr,
Speroff T: Crew resource management training– clinicians’ reactions and
attitudes. AORN 2005, 82:214-224.
26. McCulloch P, Mishra A, Handa A, Dale T, Hirst G, Catchpole K: The effects
of aviation-style non-technical skills training on technical performance
and outcome in the operating theatre. Quality and Safety in Health Care
2009, 18:109-115.
27. Grol R, Wensing M: What drives change? Barriers to and incentives for
achieving evidence-based practice. Medical Journal of Australia 2004, 180:
S57-S60.
28. Nielsen PE, Goldman MB, Mann S, Shapiro DE, Marcus RG, Pratt SD,
Greenberg P, McNamee P, Salisbury M, Birnbach DJ, et al: Effects of
teamwork training on adverse outcomes and process of care in labor
and delivery: a randomized controlled trial. Obstetrics & Gynecology 2007,
109:48-55.
29. Arts D, de KN, Scheffer GJ, de JE: Quality of data collected for severity of
illness scores in the Dutch National Intensive Care Evaluation (NICE)
registry. Intensive Care Medicine 2002, 28:656-659.
30. Smits M, Christiaans-Dingelhoff I, Wagner C, Wal G, Groenewegen PP: The
psychometric properties of the ‘Hospital Survey on Patient Safety
Culture’ in Dutch hospitals. BMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:230-238.
31. Schulz von Thun F: Hoe bedoelt u? [What do you mean?] Groningen:
Noordhoff Uitgevers BV; 2003.
32. Kirkpatrick DL, Kirkpatrick JD: Evaluating Training Programs: The Four levels
San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers Inc.; 2006.
33. Schaefer H, Helmreich R: The Operating Room Management Attitudes
Questionnaire (ORMAQ) Austin: University of Texas; 1993.
34. Edmondson AC: Speaking up in the operating room: How team leaders
promote learning in interdisciplinary action teams. Journal of
Management Studies 2003, 40:1419-1452.
35. Van Dyck C: Putting errors to good use: Error management culture in
organizations Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam; 2000.
36. Groeneweg J: Controlling the uncontrollable: Preventing business upsets
Leiden: Global Safety Group; 2002.
37. Reason J: Human error: models and management. Western Journal of
Medicine 2000, 172:393-396.
38. Sorra JS, Nieva VF: Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture Rockville, MD:
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality; 2004.
39. Marshall DA, Manus DA: A team training program using human factors to
enhance patient safety. AORN 2007, 86:994-1011.
40. Van Noord I, De Bruijne MC, Twisk JW: The relationship between patient
safety culture and the implementation of organizational patient safety
defences at emergency departments. International Journal for Quality in
Health Care 2010, 22:162-169.
41. Van Dyck C, Frese M, Baer M, Sonnentag S: Organizational error
management culture and its impact on performance: A two-study
replication. Journal of Applied Psychology 2005, 90:1228-1240.
42. Hofmann DA, Mark B: An investigation of the relationship between safety
climate and medication errors as well as other nurse and patient
outcomes. Personnel Psychology 2006, 59:847-869.
43. Broers P, Evers A, Cooper CL: Differences in Occupational Stress in 3
European Countries. International Journal of Stress Management 1995,
2:171-180.
44. Cooper CL, Marshall J: Occupational Sources of Stress - Review of
Literature Relating to Coronary Heart-Disease and Mental Ill Health.
Journal of Occupational Psychology 1976, 49:11-28.
45. De Gilder D, Van den Heuvel H, Ellemers N: A three component model of
organizational commitment. Gedrag en Organisatie 1997, 10:95-106.
46. Allen NJ, Meyer JP: The Measurement and Antecedents of Affective,
Continuance and Normative Commitment to the Organization. Journal of
Occupational Psychology 1990, 63:1-18.
47. Antersijn PAM, Verhoef MC: Assessment of non-technical skills: Is it
possible? In Applications of psychology to the aviation system: Proceedings of
the 21st conference of the European Association for Aviation Psychology
(EAAP). Volume 1. Edited by: McDonald N, Johnston N, Fuller R. Aldershot,
England: Avebury Aviation; 1995:243-250.
48. Hart SG, Staveland LE: Development of NASA-TLX (Task Load Index):
Results of empirical and theoretical research. In Human Mental Workload.
Edited by: Hancock PA, Meshkati N. Amsterdam: North Holland Press; 1988:.
49. Arbous MS, Beishuizen A, Bosman RJ, Buise MP, Dawson L, Meeder JHJ,
Salet GAM: Complicatieregistratie van de Intensive Care in Nederland.
Netherlands Journal of Critical Care 2008, 12:294-301.
50. Arts DG, de Keizer NF, Scheffer GJ: Defining and improving data quality in
medical registries: a literature review, case study, and generic
framework. Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association 2002,
9:600-611.
51. Knaus WA, Draper EA, Wagner DP, Zimmerman JE: APACHE II: a severity of
disease classification system. Critical Care Medicine 1985, 13:818-829.
52. Brinkman S, Bakhshi-Raiez F, Abu-Hanna A, De Jonge E, Bosman RJ,
Peelen L, De Keizer NF: External validation of Acute Physiology and
Chronic Health Evaluation IV in Dutch intensive care units and
comparison with Acute Physiology and Chronic Health Evaluation II and
Simplified Acute Physiology Score II. Journal of Critical Care 2010, 26:11-18.
53. Le Gall JR, Lemeshow S, Saulnier F: A new Simplified Acute Physiology
Score (SAPS II) based on a European/North American multicenter study.
Journal of the American Medical Association 1993, 270:2957-2963.
54. Oostenbrink JB, Buijs-Van der WT, van AM, Koopmanschap MA, Rutten FF:
Unit costs of inpatient hospital days. Pharmacoeconomics 2003,
21:263-271.
55. Oostenbrink JB, Koopmanschap MA, Rutten FF: Standardization of costs:
The Dutch Manual for Costing in economic evaluations.
Pharmacoeconomics 2002, 20:443-454.
56. Brown C, Hofer T, Johal A, Thomson R, Nicholl J, Franklin BD, Lilford RJ: An
epistemology of patient safety research: a framework for study design
and interpretation. Part 1. Conceptualising and developing
interventions. Quality and Safety in Health Care 2008, 17:158-162.
57. Donabedian A: Explorations in quality assessment and monitoring. In The
definition of quality and approaches to it assessment. Edited by: Griffith JR.
Ann Arbor: Health Administration Press; 1980:.
58. Rabin BA, Brownson RC, Haire-Joshu D, Kreuter MW, Weaver NL: A glossary
for dissemination and implementation research in health. Journal of
Public Health Management and Practice 2008, 14:117-123.
59. Brown C, Hofer T, Johal A, Thomson R, Nicholl J, Franklin BD, Lilford RJ: An
epistemology of patient safety research: a framework for study design
and interpretation. Part 3. End points and measurement. Quality and
Safety in Health Care 2008, 17:170-177.
60. Taylor CR, Hepworth JT, Buerhaus PI, Dittus R, Speroff T: Effect of crew
resource management on diabetes care and patient outcomes in an
inner-city primary care clinic. Quality and Safety in Health Care 2007,
16:244-247.
61. Eccles M, Grimshaw J, Campbell M, Ramsay C: Research designs for
studies evaluating the effectiveness of change and improvement
strategies. Quality and Safety in Health Care 2003, 12:47-52.
62. Edwards E: Man and Machine: Systems for safety. British Airline Pilots
Associations Technical Symposium London;21-36.
63. Hawkins FH: Human factors in flight Aldershot: Ashgate; 1987.
64. Shapell SA, Wiegman DA: The Human Factors Analysis and Classification
System Washington DC; 2000.
65. Hersey P, Blanchard KH: Management of Organizational Behavior New Jersey:
Prentice Hall; 1977.
66. Endsley MR: Theoretical underpinnings of situational awareness: A critical
review. In Situation awareness analysis and measurement. Edited by: Endsley
MR, Garland DJ. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates; 2000:.
67. Ingham H: The Johari window a graphic model of interpersonal
awareness. Western training laboratory in group development Los Angeles.
68. Janis I: Victims of groupthink: A psychological study of forgein-policy decisions
and fiascoes Boston: Houghton Mifflin; 1972.
Pre-publication history
The pre-publication history for this paper can be accessed here:
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/11/304/prepub
doi:10.1186/1472-6963-11-304
Cite this article as: Kemper et al.: Effectiveness of classroom based crew
resource management training in the intensive care unit: study design
of a controlled trial. BMC Health Services Research 2011 11:304.
Kemper et al. BMC Health Services Research 2011, 11:304
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/11/304
Page 11 of 11
